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presented at [name, location and date of conference]. 
 
1 Introduction 
A large literature has emerged which studies the interactions of firms in global value 
chains (GVCs). The term is used to emphasise that the range of tasks and activities 
required to produce a good are increasingly performed by independent firms that are 
located in different countries. Calling this a value chain rather than a supply chain further 
emphasises that this phenomenon goes beyond the sequential production steps, but 
encompasses all activities that add value to a product, including design, logistics, and 
marketing. 
The GVC literature is replete with empirical evidence supporting the view that buyer-
supplier relationships are not all of a same, generic kind. Many case studies illustrate that 
the way relationships are governed depends on the norms and standards of an industry, 
the technological maturity of the components being traded, and the distribution of power. 
However, most studies look at either a specific industry or a handful of special cases, 
which makes it difficult to disentangle the unique features of relationship governance in 
an industry from the underlying forces that determine the choices of firms more 
generally, e.g., choices of scale and technology. 
We follow the GVC literature, in particular the stylised model of Gereffi et al. (2005) 
to obtain predictions about the optimal form of governance in different situations. In that 
model, three key characteristics of transactions – i.e., complexity, codifiability and the 
capabilities of the supply base – are used to identify five situations that call for different 
forms of relationship governance. They are labelled hierarchical, captive, relational, 
modular and market. While these labels do not have much meaning on their own, the 
wealth of case studies conducted by GVC researches provides information on features 
that characterise each particular governance form, even when it occurs in different 
industries.1 
The objective of this paper is to verify whether the GVC predictions are confirmed in 
the sourcing patterns of automakers. We exploit the well-documented fact that the 
automobile sector is one of the most downstream manufacturing industries see for 
example Antràs et al. (2012). It implies that carmakers need to interact with virtually all 
other manufacturing industries and will source inputs in a wide range of situations. As 
cars are very complex products consisting of a bewildering number of components, the 
automotive industry is a unique laboratory to test the GVC theory in a systematic way. It 
touches on a myriad of other industries, generating different situations for the same set of 
lead firms. We can thus verify whether they tailor their behaviour, i.e., their supplier 
governance, to the situation. We ask whether the same firm organises separate parts of its 
supply chain differently if the situation calls for it. We will analyse quantitatively 
whether the correlation between governance types and the characteristics of the product 
or supplier accords with the GVC predictions. 
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In our empirical analysis we use a rich new data set of supply relationships between 
carmakers and automotive suppliers for individual components, see Schmitt and Van 
Biesebroeck (2013) for details. A transaction is defined as a buyer-supplier-component 
triplet and we observe more than 50,000 of them. We use this information to make two 
contributions. First, we show how we can operationalise the GVC theory by constructing 
proxies for each form of relationship governance form in a generic way, while measuring 
the three characteristics of transactions in a way tailored particularly to the automotive 
sector. Second, as we are careful to use independent information to measure both sets of 
variables, we test whether the GVC predictions linking the characteristics to optimal 
governance types are borne out in the data. We start by focusing on the initial outsourcing 
decision, but show how sourcing evolves once it is initiated. 
We find that the predictions of the GVC theory hold to a large extent. To understand 
why multiple forms of relationship governance can coexist within a single industry, we 
propose the following logic. It is easiest to describe it in a dynamic way, suggesting an 
evolution over time, but it applies similarly to compare transactions with different 
characteristics at one point in time. When new components using novel technologies are 
introduced, they tend to be complex. No suppliers exist that have the knowledge or 
capabilities to produce them and a lack of standardisation makes it hard to codify design 
and performance requirements (Stigler, 1951). Hence, carmakers will initially prefer to 
produce them in-house. As technologies evolve and production and design practices are 
perfected, some of the initial difficulties associated with outsourcing can be overcome. If 
codifiability improves first, it allows for a switch from hierarchy (in-house production) to 
captive governance; if the capability of existing suppliers improves first, relational 
governance will be the first choice of governance form. Subsequently, as suppliers gain 
experience they will further improve their capabilities and find out ways to codify aspects 
of the transaction, allowing the superior modular form of governance to become viable 
(Sturgeon, 2002). It allows carmakers and suppliers to focus on their respective 
comparative advantages, while still stimulating technological innovation. With this shift, 
the balance of power also tends to shift from the buyer to the supplier. Finally, when an 
existing technology becomes common knowledge and best practices become widespread, 
lower transaction complexity allows the market form of governance to emerge, where 
competition is more on price than on quality. 
Our objective is not to derive implications for strategy and policy or generate 
predictions about the future, but to assess the explanatory power of one specific 
theoretical model. Our findings build on the GVC literature and provide supporting 
evidence exploiting the interactions of a narrow set of automotive lead firms with a broad 
range of other manufacturing sectors. Bensaou (1999) uses a different conceptual 
framework, but exploits this same feature of the auto industry. The approach differs from 
many other studies that provide evidence for the popularity of one governance type in one 
particular sector or investigate which governance type is the best characterisation for 
observed relationships in one sector, e.g., Asanuma (1989), Humphrey (2003) and 
Sturgeon et al. (2008) do this for the automotive sector. By focusing on the predictive 
power of a few key characteristics, we illustrate the predictive power of GVC theory and 
along the way we discuss to what extent these predictions differ from those made in the 
field of transaction cost economics (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979) or the property 
rights theory, (Grossman and Hart, 1986) which have been particularly influential in the 
theory of the firm. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give some 
background information on the breath of sourcing relationships in the automotive sector. 
In Section 3 we describe the GVC framework and distil theoretical predictions. In  
Section 4 we introduce the data and measurement of the governance types and transaction 
characteristics. In Section 5 we present the results and we close with conclusions in 
Section 6. 
2 Component sourcing in the automotive sector 
The organisation of the automotive sector, where carmakers are responsible for design, 
final assembly and marketing while a tiered supply chain takes up the production of 
thousands of different components, has been documented extensively [see for example 
Helper (1991) for a historical perspective]. Sturgeon et al. (2008) provide a 
complementary introduction, highlighting the importance of regional networks and 
clusters and documenting recent trends.2 
We mentioned already that the auto sector interacts with many other sectors of the 
economy. As this feature motivates our empirical strategy to systematically test GVC 
predictions in a cross-section of industries, we provide concrete evidence in Table 1 
which lists the most important industries where the suppliers in our dataset come from. 
Parts are sourced from virtually every other manufacturing industry and even many 
service industries provide inputs, ranging from logistics to software development. To 
classify transactions, we only use the two-digit NACE code for the suppliers’ plants 
which are labelled as production locations to avoid including the activities of other 
divisions of a firm that might not be related to its automotive supply activities.3 
Not surprisingly, sector 29, which contains firms directly working in the motor 
vehicle industry, occurs most frequently, but it represents fewer than 40% of 
observations. Sector 29 comprises several more detailed subsectors for industries such as 
‘manufacture of bodies for motor vehicles’ (Sector 29.20) or ‘manufacture of electrical 
and electronic equipment for motor vehicles’ (Sector 29.31). Because these are industries 
that differ in their location along the value chain and in the dominant technology they 
use, sourcing practices are unlikely to be the same for all of them. 
Most other manufacturing sectors are represented in Table 1. Note that even a share 
of just 1% in the sample represents almost 400 observations. Some service sectors, such 
as ‘computer programming, consultancy and related activities’ or ‘repair and installation 
of machinery and equipment’ are well represented too. 
Given the wide spectrum of industries that suppliers come from, it is to be expected 
that the way they interact with automotive lead firms will also differ. A couple of 
important dimensions of heterogeneity are as follows: the level of sophistication of the 
production technology, the extent to which a particular component is integrated in a 
larger module, the capabilities and assets a supplier has acquired over its existence, and 
the importance of a component relative to the overall value of a vehicle. Each of these 
aspects is likely to influence the preferred form of supplier governance for lead firms. In 
the next section we describe the GVC theory which focuses on three characteristics in 
particular as determinants of sourcing relationships. 
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Table 1 NACE sectors of the manufacturing plants of suppliers 
two-digit 





29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and  
semi-trailers 
14,489 39.2% 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 4,046 10.9% 
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment  3,710 10.0% 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
2,901 7.8% 
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 2,741 7.4% 
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 2,165 5.9% 
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 
products 
1,652 4.5% 
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
1,381 3.7% 
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 992 2.7% 
13 Manufacture of textiles 973 2.6% 
24 Manufacture of basic metals 497 1.3% 
32 Other manufacturing 410 1.1% 
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related 
activities 
314 0.8% 
43 Specialised construction activities 188 0.5% 
31 Manufacture of furniture 152 0.4% 
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum 
products 
107 0.3% 
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 103 0.3% 
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 97 0.3% 
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 57 0.2% 
15 Manufacture of leather and related products 16 < 0.1% 
Notes: This sample only includes the transactions for which we could link the supplier in 
our main dataset from SupplierBusiness to the Amadeus dataset from which we 
derived the control variables in the analysis. It amounts to 64.5% of the total 
sample, or 36,991 observations in total. 
3 Theoretical framework 
The GVC framework that we take as basis for our empirical analysis was introduced by 
Gereffi et al. (2005). Extrapolating from case studies of several industries and drawing on 
key variables from various theories, they argue that three variables – different 
characteristics of transactions or suppliers – are of crucial importance in shaping the 
nature of the supply relationships. As Hierarchy (in-house production) is included as one 
of the five possible supply relationships, the explanatory variables also influence whether 
outsourcing is possible or desirable at all. 
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The theories and concepts the GVC theory draws upon are very extensive. It includes 
asset specificity from transactions cost economics, relational linkages from network 
theory in the fields of industrial sociology and economic geography, supplier competence 
and the resource view of the firm from management, and the concept of modularity from 
the technology management literature. As it would take us too far to revisit all these 
connections with the literature, we refer readers interested in the theoretical grounding of 
the GVC predictions to the original article. Here, we first discuss the three characteristics 
used to predict sourcing decisions, followed by a discussion of the five different supplier 
governance types and the specific predictions linking the characteristics to the 
governance types. We provide references along the way to connect these concepts to 
other literatures that readers might be already familiar with. 
A first characteristic that is used widely also in other literatures is complexity. It is 
related to the inability to specify a supplier’s obligations ex ante in an enforceable 
contract, the common assumption in the incomplete contracts literature. Work in 
transaction cost economics (TCE), see for example Klein et al. (1978) or Williamson 
(1979), also takes as starting point that transactions are sufficiently complex that the 
potential hold-up problem when they need to be adjusted in the future cannot be resolved 
by writing a detailed contract. This can be due to excessive uncertainty, contracting being 
too expensive, or contracts being unenforceable by outside parties, for example because 
only insiders can assess product or service quality.4 
A useful, but narrow definition of codifiability, the second characteristic, is given by 
Levi et al. (2003). They define it as an indicator of how precise the nature of the product 
or service that is the subject of a contract can be characterised in electronic format. The 
ability to specify performance requirements ex-ante and in a readily verifiable way is one 
aspect that makes a transaction more codifiable. But it also includes: “delivery 
requirements and any other requirements that may pertain to a specific transaction, in a 
manner understandable to relevant parties. Codifiability has two dimensions: (1) the 
codifiability of the component as such and (2) the codifiability of its interfaces with other 
parts of the car.” (Levi et al., 2003) For some products, for example a PC, all components 
in the system are highly codifiable and the product can be split into modules in various 
ways. In other cases, only specific points in the system are codifiable, for example the 
link between chip design and fabrication in the semi-conductor industry. The study of the 
electronics industry in Sturgeon (2002) highlights the important role played by 
codifiability in the emergence of modular, or ‘turnkey’ suppliers. 
The third characteristic is the capability of potential suppliers. The relevance of this 
concept for outsourcing finds antecedents in the economics and management strategy 
literatures. Stigler (1951) famously wrote that outsourcing is limited by the extent of the 
market. Only when there are enough reliable and able suppliers around will outsourcing 
become a viable business strategy. Penrose (1959) launched the resource-based view of 
the firm. The competitive advantage of a firm, and hence also its attractiveness as a 
supplier, stems from the strategic resources a firm has control over and which are rare, 
difficult to duplicate, and valuable. 
If either of the three characteristics can be high or low, they allow for a total of eight 
permutations or possible governance types. However, not all combinations of highs 
and/or lows are equally likely. In particular, for transactions or products that are not 
complex, it is unlikely that its performance characteristics are difficult to codify or that 
there exist no capable suppliers to produce it. Such situations are likely to be rare and the 
theory abstracts from them. If complexity is low, the codifiability and capability 
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requirements for successful outsourcing will generally be met automatically.5 These 
requirements are not absolute, but should be assessed relative to the complexity of the 
transaction. As a result, we can simplify the set of possible permutations to five relevant 
governance types which are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2 Determinants of GVC governance 
 Complexity of transaction 
Ability to codify 
transactions Capability of supplier 
Market Low High* High* 
Modular High High High 
Relational High Low High 
Captive High High Low 
Hierarchy High Low Low 
Notes: Adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005, p.87). *High codifiability and high supplier 
capability for market governance has to be interpreted in light of the low 
complexity of the transaction. They are not necessarily higher than the low values 
that are indicated for either dimension further below in the table in the case of 
complex transactions. 
At the two extremes, in the first and last lines, are the make-or-buy options that also 
feature in standard economic models on the theory of the firm. If a transaction is not 
complex, outsourcing is feasible and suppliers will mainly compete on price. In the GVC 
framework, such relationships are called market, as buyers and sellers have minimal 
interactions and can even be anonymous. This fits well with many models that focus on 
market clearing and the role of demand and supply shifters. It contrasts with the situation 
depicted in the bottom line of Table 2 where transactions are complex, but it is difficult 
or impossible to codify performance characteristics and there are no suppliers with the 
necessary capabilities to produce the parts. In that case, the only viable alternative for the 
buyer is to make the part in-house, called hierarchy. Gibbons (2005) presents several 
distinct modelling approaches to study this make-or-buy, markets-versus-hierarchy, and 
dichotomy in a unified framework 
The novel aspect of the GVC framework is to consider the intermediate governance 
types where products are outsourced, but not left to impersonal markets where price is the 
dominant product dimension. In a modular relationship, the supplier will have unique 
technology or capabilities that can be generically applied in products sold to several 
clients. The modular supplier will perform several activities, with break-points in the 
value chain occurring where the information exchange regarding a product’s performance 
or functionality can be formalised easily. The relational-type of supplier governance will 
feature intensive collaboration between the client and supplier, characterised by frequent 
meetings to exchange information and solve problems together. Often, personnel of one 
of the firms will work on the other firm’s premises. The defining characteristic in a 
captive relationship is the high concentration of a supplier’s sales with a single client. 
Often, the client discourages a supplier to work for its competitors. 
Others have of course also made contributions in this direction. The seminal work of 
Powell (1990) highlights the important category of network interactions where the  
buyer-supplier relationship is much more involved than in market interactions. Baker  
et al. (2002) study relational contracts which can be readily applied to the buyer-supplier 
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interaction. Their repeated interaction framework is very flexible, but as we know from 
the ‘folk theorem’ in game theory it can rationalise virtually every type of interaction. 
Williamson (1985) analyses a variety of dedicated forms of organisation or contracting 
that can suit the needs of a situation. Levin and Tadelis (2010) provide an explicit model 
with empirical evidence studying alternative contracting forms used in government 
procurement. Helper (1991) shows how relationships in US automotive industry have 
evolved from the traditional arm’s length market type. 
The attractiveness of the GVC framework is that it limits the intermediate governance 
forms to only three ‘types’ and that only two characteristics are used to distinguish 
between different complex transactions. The theory thus generates explicit and testable 
predictions. For each of the governance forms in the five rows of Table 2 we are given a 
combination of high or low values of the characteristics that would make that particular 
form the most preferred one. In our empirical analysis, we will test the GVC theory by 
verifying whether differences in characteristics indeed correspond to the predicted 
differences in the observed governance. 
Naturally, other characteristics of transactions besides those in the three columns of 
Table 2 are important and they could be introduced to obtain a finer typology of souring 
types. Specifically for the auto sector, important aspects that are omitted are the 
technology transfer to local firms happening through the collaboration with MNCs 
(Sönmez, 2013) and the enduring importance of distance in the selection of suppliers 
(Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck, 2013).6 However, the three types listed are useful because 
a wealth of case study evidence exists that describes various aspects of these sourcing 
types and makes the differences concrete. In the next section, we will draw on the GVC 
literature to devise a method to identify the types in our dataset, using objective and 
quantifiable measures. Here, we briefly describe a few key distinctions between the three 
intermediate types. 
When a product’s performance characteristics can be straightforwardly codified, 
outsourcing is in principle feasible. How to organise the relationship in practice depends 
on the capabilities of potential suppliers relative to the complexity of the product. When 
the product is not complex, almost by definition suppliers with sufficient skills can be 
found and we expect market transactions that are governed by price. When capabilities of 
suppliers are not sufficiently developed relative to the complexity of the product, one 
solution is for the buyer to transfer some capabilities or know-how to the supplier. It 
seems natural, however, that as a precondition a buyer will not allow the supplier to use 
the capabilities acquired in this way to work for other firms, which are often the buyer’s 
competitors.7 Such collaborations are classified as captive outsourcing. 
If product complexity and codifiability is high, but supplier capabilities have 
developed sufficiently such that the supplier can produce components of the required 
quality independently, outsourcing will be even more feasible. In this case, the supplier’s 
bargaining power will be higher and we expect them to work for several buyers.8 
Especially in sectors where technologies improve continuously over time, a supplier with 
capabilities that are sufficiently high to produce complex products will most likely have a 
comparative advantage over the buyer in certain domains. Making the part in-house 
becomes a less attractive solution for the buyer. This governance type, where the buyer 
relies heavily on a supplier and the supplier invests continually in new technologies to 
make its capabilities match the complexity of the product, is called a modular 
relationship as the supplier has a lot of control over the modules it supplies. 
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The final cases are transactions which are not codifiable. If no capable suppliers exist, 
the buyer has no alternative but to make the part itself. But even if capable suppliers 
exist, outsourcing is not straightforward. It can only succeed if the two parties collaborate 
closely, as when the personnel of each firm works at the premises of its counterparty, or 
the design team of a supplier interacts regularly with that of the buyer or with other 
suppliers involved in the development or production of the same module, as frequent 
modifications are expected. This type of governance is called relational, since the buyer 
cannot simply hand over a purchase order and a supplier cannot produce a finished 
product independently. Instead, both firms need to collaborate intensely which is 
impossible without forming an actual relationship (Asanuma, 1989). 
4 Data and measurement 
4.1 Dataset 
In the empirical work we use transaction-level data on first and lower-tier supply 
contracts. The data comes from SupplierBusiness, a consulting firm to the automotive 
industry, and it covers transactions from models that entered production between 1993 
and 2012. It includes all major carmakers and global first-tier suppliers. In addition, the 
data includes over a thousand small and medium size supplier firms located in Europe 
and North America. In total, we observe 64 unique buyers, defined as an original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) in one of the two regions, Europe or North America. We 
further observe 2,205 unique suppliers, defined as the product division of a supplier firm 
in one of the two major geographic regions. Finally, contracts are observed for 213 
unique products, defined using the detailed (nested) component categories defined by 
SupplierBusiness. A unit of observation in our analysis is a transaction, which is defined 
as a unique combination of a buyer, a supplier, and a product. 
To construct the dependent variables in the analysis, we use market shares defined 
along various dimensions, e.g., by supplier, by buyer, by product. A transaction’s 
contribution to a market share is calculated by multiplying the projected monthly 
production volume of the model by the expected time of the contract.9 
To construct control variables, we added firm-level data on OEMs and suppliers from 
Amadeus, a database with broad European coverage of firms in all sectors. The Amadeus 
dataset and matching process to the contracting data is described in more detail in 
Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck (2013). The control variables are included in the empirical 
analysis, but not reported in the tables with estimation results as they are not of 
independent interest. 
Geographic proximity is known to play an important part in both the decision to 
outsource and the choice of outsourcing relationship (Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck, 
2013). For instance, the decision to vertically integrate production sites is found to 
depend on proximity to input suppliers (Joskow, 1985). We therefore include the distance 
from the supplier plant to the client, and from the supplier plant to its nearer 
administrative office. In addition, we include a dummy variable for the effect of country 
borders, which is an important variable in the analysis of foreign direct investment. 
Cultural, historic, institutional and family ties are expected to play a role in the 
organisation of outsourcing relationships. We include a variable of cultural distance 
measured at the country level using survey data of Hofstede (1980). The index is 
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calculated as the Mahalanobis distance over four dimensions: individualism, power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. 
We include contract length as proxied by the number of months between the start and 
end of production of a car model. Longer contracts can be seen as a compensation for 
uncertainty in a buyer-supplier relation (Joskow, 1985). We control for several aspects of 
the production technology of the supplier, such as the number of workers at all 
production plants of a supplier, the capital intensity, measured as the total value of assets 
per worker at the plant, and a proxy for value added, defined as operating revenues over 
total assets. 
Finally, because differences in corporate strategies might have an important effect on 
governance choices, we include two sets of dummies for the region of the supplier and 
carmaker, as well as firm-fixed effects at the headquarters level of the carmaker. 
4.2 Three transaction characteristics 
To test the GVC predictions on the likely form of supplier governance, we construct 
proxies for the three characteristics listed in the columns of Table 2: codifiability, 
complexity, and capability. Importantly, we use information on the nature of the 
component or the identity of the supplier, but not information related to the buyer or the 
buyer-supplier interaction. This mirrors the approach in the seminal study of Monteverde 
and Teece (1982) which used expert surveys to independently assess the engineering 
requirements involved in the design and production of different car components as a 
predictor of automakers’ outsourcing decision. 
4.2.1 Complexity 
To ascertain whether a part is complex or not, we exploit the tree-like structure of the 
component category classification as it is organised by the data provider, 
SupplierBusiness. We measure the complexity of each component by the number of sub-
categories it branches into. Our objective is not so much to capture the technological 
complexity of production, but the extent and intensity of interactions with the buyer or 
with other suppliers that work on related components. If such linkages are very deep, 
suppliers would be more uncertain about possible future modifications and the potential 
for hold-up is greater.10 In the TCE framework of Williamson (1985), greater complexity 
defined this way would make it less likely that a firm outsources a part. 
To obtain a simple measure, we count the number of sub-categories.11 To remain 
close to the theory where transactions are ranked high or low on each dimension, we 
dichotomise the variable by indicating whether a value is below or above the sample 
median. In panel (a) of Table 3 we show the mean and standard deviation of all three 
explanatory variables. Following our procedure, the mean for the discrete complexity 
variable is 0.581, which implies that 58% of the transactions in the data correspond to 
complex outsourcing relationships.12 
4.2.2 Codifiability 
In practice, a component is codifiable if the buyer is able to easily specify the 
performance characteristics the part has to meet for the supplier that will then produce 
and possibly also design it. If a part occurs in a large number of sub-assemblies that occur 
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all over a vehicle, it is not very specific to a single module or application. Such 
widespread use of a component will make it appear in a larger number of outsourcing 
relationships and likely to be more standardised. 
Table 3 Summary statistics 
a Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. dev.  
Explanatory variables    
 Complexity 0.581 0.493  
 Codifiability 0.307 0.461  
 Capability 0.453 0.498  
Dependent variables    
 Hierarchy 10.98 1.23 –ln(σbspm) 
 Captive 2.43 1.94 –ln(σs/σb) 
 Relational 3.62 1.68 –ln(σbsp/σs) 
 Modular 2.75 1.43 –ln(σbs/σs) 
 Market 1.29 1.62 –ln(σs/σp) 
b Partial correlation statistics between the three explanatory variables 
 Complexity Codifiability Capability 
Complexity 1 –0.728 0.021 
Codifiability  1 –0.025 
Capability   1 
We again rely on the way the automotive experts of SupplierBusiness have organised the 
component information in the dataset. They first classified all transactions into a number 
of areas of the vehicle, such as engine, body and trim, interior, chassis, etc. For each of 
these areas there is a second level of sub-categories according to the function of the 
module, such as a bumper, braking system, console, etc. Below this, in the third level 
sub-categories, components that do not share many characteristics with others are listed 
in a number of unique categories. The more complex a module is, the more groups there 
are at this third level. Some components with standardised characteristics are produced 
by several firms and used in several places in the vehicle, examples include bearings, 
gaskets, sensors, etc. Hence, a simple measure of codifiability is a simple count of the 
number of times a component occurs in distinct third-level sub-categories. To make the 
variable less sensitive to outliers and facilitate interpretation in the regressions, we again 
dichotomise it by splitting it at the median. 
Also for codifiability we have experimented with an alternative measure using 
information from outside our dataset. We alternatively classified a component as 
codifiable if it is covered by automotive open system architecture (AUTOSAR).13 This is 
a project of car assemblers and suppliers who cooperate to develop open industry 
standards. The initiative addresses the quickly increasing sophistication of electric and 
electronic systems in cars which limits the exchange of applications between assemblers 
and suppliers. The objective is to move away from proprietary solutions, prevalent in the 
car industry, and to optimise the interfaces of and interactions between components. 
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Using this variable yielded consistent results, but it reduced our sample size as it is not 
observed for each component. 
4.2.3 Capability 
The third explanatory variable of interest is supplier capability. Following the literature 
on dynamic market equilibria, we measure it as the size of a supplier relative to its age. 
Firm dynamics in that literature stem from firms’ differences in innate productivity which 
they discover through their own market operations. More productive firms will hire 
additional input factors and survive for a longer period. This selection mechanism is 
especially appropriate for the last 20 years in the automotive industry, as it has 
consolidated through mergers, witnessed a lot of supplier exit in the great recession, and 
the industry globalised enormously which allowed the most efficient firms to increase in 
size. 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) show that it is important to control for firm age when 
studying firm growth as it will take firms some time to reach their desired size. A related 
literature on firm capability and learning argues that firms compete on the basis of 
internal resources that take time to develop (Penrose, 1959). These capabilities do not 
necessarily have to be technological sophistication, but can be any skill that helps a firm 
to prosper and survive, e.g., low cost manufacturing prowess. 
We measure size using turnover (operating revenues in 2007) and divided by the age 
of its main EU branch or regional headquarters. Both variables are available in the 
Amadeus dataset. We preferred using firm size by sales rather than R&D expenditures as 
the latter variable would also capture the complexity of the components a firm produces. 
We again make the variable binary by assigning a value of one to all firms older than the 
sample median, which classifies 45% of suppliers as highly capable. 
Panel (b) in Table 3 shows partial correlations between the three explanatory 
variables. Perhaps not surprisingly, the correlation is relatively high (in absolute value) 
for complexity and codifiability which were both measured based on the component 
classification. In contrast, the capability measure is almost orthogonal to the other two 
variables showing partial correlations statistics close to zero. 
4.3 Five governance types 
To identify governance types in supplier sourcing, we exploit the frequency that different 
transactions occur in the dataset. We could simply count transactions, e.g., calculate the 
share of transactions for each supplier in the dataset, in which case the variables would 
have a probability interpretation. However, the predictive power of the regressions 
proved to be higher if we weigh each transaction with the total production volume of the 
model it involves (qbspm). 
As the governance types cannot be observed directly, we rely on documented 
characteristics of each type from case studies in the GVC literature to construct a separate 
variable for each type. In particular, we construct a variable that is monotonically 
increasing in the likelihood a transaction is of a given type. As we want an approach that 
works generically, we propose a ratio of two shares as proxy for each governance type, 
where the literature has guided us in the selection of the different shares in the numerator 
or denominator. 
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The first problem we faced is how to identify Hierarchy transactions. By construction, 
we only observe transactions for components that are actually outsourced. Transactions 
we do not observe could simply be missing (as the dataset is not exhaustive), they could 
be for specialised components not used in a particular vehicle, or they could be 
components produced in-house by the OEM. Our solution is to calculate the (weighted) 
frequency a component is outsourced as a proxy for one minus the probability of 
Hierarchy. If a component is rarely observed in the dataset for any of the car models, it is 
likely to be produced in-house by most firms (Stigler, 1951). This relies on the 
convergence in sourcing practices in the industry (Monteverde and Teece, 1982;  
Van Biesebroeck, 2003) and on a random selection of transactions into our dataset. 
We normalise the frequency of outsourcing, i.e., the quantity qbspm of a transaction for 
a given buyer, supplier, component and car model, by the total market size for parts in a 
year (number of vehicles produced times average number of parts per vehicle). This ratio 
is very small on average, but varies considerably. To use this relative market share as a 
measure of Hierarchy in the regressions, we take the logarithm which has much smaller 
variation and the mean is better centred. We also use the negative of the logarithm as it is 
a low value that raises the likelihood of hierarchy.14 Table 3 shows the mean and standard 
deviations of all dependent variables and Table 4 summarises the definition, the intuition, 
and the exact construction. Note that the normalisation by the total market size becomes a 
constant, additive term after taking logarithms and we can drop it as it does not influence 
the estimates. 
Table 4 Definitions of the dependent variables identifying governance forms 
Name Interpretation Definition Formula 
Hierarchy The transaction, which is defined at the 
buyer-supplier-product-car model level, 
exhibits a low market share in the 
sample.  
–lnσbspm –lnqbspm 
Captive Supplier s has a low market share while 













− ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
Relational The specific buyer-product relationship 
bp accounts only for a small fraction of 










− ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
Modular Supplier s has a relatively high market 
share compared to the set of products 













+ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑  
Market A low market share for supplier s 














− ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑ ∑  
Notes: The subscripts bspm stand for buyer, supplier, product, and model, respectively. 
The sum of quantities in the numerators and denominators become market shares 
after dividing by the quantity for the entire market. In the last four definitions, this 
normalisation cancels out when dividing the two shares; in the definition of 
hierarchy, the total market quantity would be a constant in the regression after 
taking logarithms without affecting the estimates. 
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For the other governance types we use a similar approach, but as they are defined over 
transactions which are actually outsourced and observed in the dataset, it is only a matter 
of selecting the appropriate relative shares.15 We base ourselves on the extensive GVC 
literature for this. The different market shares that enter these calculations, which are 
listed in the third column of Table 4, are the total market shares of the buyer, seller, or 
product over the entire market (σb, σs and σp), the market share of a particular buyer-
supplier pair over all products they exchange (σbs), and the same share limited to a single 
product p (σbsp), but still summing over all models. The reasoning why a large value of 
each dependent variable maps into a high likelihood for a particular governance type is as 
follows. 
Captive relationships will be characterised by a small market share for the supplier 
relative to the buyer it sells to, i.e., σs/σb is low and the negative of the logarithm of this 
relative market share – the dependent variable shown in Table 4 – is high (Ahmadjian 
and Oxley, 2013).16 In Relational governance the supplier is independent and sought after 
for its unique expertise. This expertise is very much at the level of a product which is 
often uniquely tailored to a buyer’s needs (Bensaou, 1999; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 
2011). As a result, the share of each buyer-product share in the supplier’s overall sales is 
limited (Asanuma, 1989; Sturgeon et al. 2008). The same independence of the supplier is 
true in Modular relationships, but here one particular product can account for a large 
share of a supplier’s market share (Sturgeon, 2002). The entire business of each buyer 
will still account for a relative small fraction of a supplier’s overall market share, but 
individual components might dominate a buyer-supplier relationship (Humphrey, 2003). 
Market relationships will have low supplier market shares relative to the overall product 
market (Stigler, 1951). 
5 Results 
5.1 Make-or-buy decision 
The make-or-buy decision is studied extensively in the literature and we already know 
several features of products or characteristics of transactions that are often linked to 
outsourcing. To understand better how our three characteristics of interest should be 
interpreted, we first investigate how they correlate with the initial outsourcing decision. 
The GVC framework explicitly predicts that high complexity combined with low 
codifiability and low capability should raise the likelihood of hierarchy. 
The regressions reported in the first three columns of Table 5 show that all three 
theoretical predictions are borne out in the data. Each of the variables has a sign 
consistent with the GVC prediction in a regression that has the Hierarchy proxy as 
dependent variable. Firms will choose not to outsource a component and prefer to make 
the part in-house when the transaction is complex, when it is difficult to codify, and when 
the capability of the suppliers that produce these parts for competitors is low. The results 
in column (4) show that the estimates are highly similar when we include all three 
variables simultaneously in the regression. Even though the complexity and codifiability 
variables were strongly correlated, they do seem to capture independent variation in the 
dependent variable. 
The first two point estimates are highly statistically significant, but the coefficient on 
the capability variable is not. There are several reasons for this (also discussed further 
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below). First, we only observe the latter variables for firms that we have been able to 
match to the Amadeus database, which is only half of the sample. Second, by 
construction, only a few competing firms outsource these parts and hence the 
characteristics of their suppliers, including their average capability, is likely to be 
observed with noise. Third, while Hierarchy is a desirable strategy when supplier 
capabilities are low, this is not the only alternative. The GVC predictions in Table 2 show 
that Captive outsourcing can be an alternative, at least if codifiability is sufficiently high 
(relative to the complexity of the transaction). 
Table 5 Make-or-buy decision in general 
 
Dependent variable is the hierarchy proxy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Complexity 0.147***   0.061* –0.004 
(0.014)   (0.034) (0.036) 
Codifiability  –0.178***  –0.156*** –0.192*** 
 (0.015)  (0.037) (0.039) 
Capability   –0.017 –0.022 0.112*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) 
Control variables No No No No Yes 
Observations 31,459 31,459 14,061 14,061 12,060 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.078 
Notes: Estimation is with ordinary least squares in columns (1) to (4) and with the fixed 
effects panel data estimator in column (5) where a full set of buyer and supplier 
fixed effects are included. Control variables as described in the data section are 
included in column (5), but not reported. The statistical significance of the point 
estimates is indicated as: *for the 10% level, **5%, ***1%. 
In column (5) of the same table we show estimates where control variables and buyer and 
supplier fixed effects are also included in the regression. This changes some of the 
results. Only the codifiability variable still has the expected, negative sign and remains 
statistically significant. The first-order effect of the complexity variable seems to be 
captured already by the control variables; the remaining, independent variation is not 
significantly correlated anymore with the dependent variable. 
While the capability variable at least had the expected negative sign in column (4), 
this is not the case anymore in column (5). Multicollinearity might have contributed to 
the sign change as the capability of a supplier is now already captured by the value added 
and capital intensity control variables. However, the coefficient on the capability variable 
in column (5) is positive and significant, the opposite of our expectation. We have two 
explanations for this unexpected result. First, this could be due to a measurement 
problem. We are trying to measure the capability of potential suppliers for parts which 
are almost always produced in-house. We proxy this using the capability of suppliers in 
the few cases where such transactions are outsourced, but in these rare occasions the 
chosen suppliers might simply be unusually capable and not representative. Second, 
transactions can be outsourced using several forms of supplier governance. In a captive 
relationship supplier capabilities are predicted to be low. Given that the alternative to 
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hierarchy mixes several forms of outsourcing with different predictions on supplier 
capability, compositional effects can influence the point estimate. 
Similarly, an insignificant coefficient on complexity is not evidence against the GVC 
theory as outsourced transactions will include low complexity Market relationships. We 
can test the GVC predictions in a more careful way, by constructing a different dependent 
variable for each pairwise comparison of governance types. In the regressions reported in 
Table 5, we characterised the governance of transactions along a single dimension, i.e., to 
what extent are they outsourced or of the Hierarchy type. However, each transaction has a 
positive probability to be any of the four outsourcing types and we can take into account 
which type of outsourcing is the most appropriate comparison. 
In the next set of regressions, reported in Table 6, we use four different dependent 
variables, each time measuring the probability of the Hierarchy type relative to the 
probability for each of the other four types. We can construct the dependent variables in 
two ways, but the results turned out extremely similar. Either we can take the log 
difference of two dependent variables listed in Table 4. Alternatively, we construct for 
each regression a dummy variable which indicates for each transaction which of the two 
proxies – Hierarchy or the respective outsourcing type – has the highest value (relative to 
its own median). For example, the dependent variable used in column (1) of Table 6 
indicates for each transaction whether it is more likely to be of the hierarchy type or more 
likely to be Market. In the first case the dummy is coded as one, in the second case as 
zero. 










(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Complexity 0.330*** 0.270*** –0.316*** –0.144** 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.070) (0.072) 
Codifiability –0.246** –0.116** 0.094 –0.189** 
(0.049) (0.052) (0.075) (0.075) 
Capability –0.058** 0.337*** –0.266** –0.089** 
(0.029) (0.032) (0.045) (0.045) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,024 7,577 3,701 3,962 
R-squared 0.004 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates which of the two types 
listed in the column heading fits best for each transaction. The linear probability 
model is estimated with ordinary least squares; it includes a full set of buyer and 
supplier fixed effects and control variables as described in the data section (which 
are not reported). The statistical significance of the point estimates is indicated as: 
*for the 10% level, **5%, ***1%. 
The results in Table 6 use these discrete classifications as dependent variable and the 
same three explanatory variables as before. A positive coefficient on a variable in  
column (1) indicates that a high value is positively associated with the hierarchy type and 
negatively with market outsourcing. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we have 
shaded in each column the coefficient that corresponds to the variable where the GVC 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    In-house production versus specific forms of supplier governance 17    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
theory predicts a different high or low value for the transaction characteristic for 
hierarchy than for the relevant outsourcing type. For example, both hierarchy and captive 
relationships are expected to occur if transactions are complex and supplier capabilities 
are low. The distinguishing feature is that high codifiability makes captive outsourcing 
feasible and low codifiability forces the firm to produce the part in-house. Hence we 
shaded the codifiability coefficient in column (2). 
In each of the four columns, the sign we estimate on the shaded coefficients for the 
variables of interest corresponds to the theoretical predictions in Table 2, even including 
the control variables, and the coefficients are statistically significant in each of the four 
cases. The 0.330 estimate in column (1) implies that higher complexity makes 
outsourcing in a Market relationship particularly unlikely; the –0.116 estimate in  
column (2) implies that high codifiability facilitates captive relationships, and the  
–0.266 estimate in column (3) implies that high capability makes outsourcing with a 
relationship type of governance more likely, all exactly as predicted by the theory. 
The variation in sign for the complexity variable across the different regressions in 
columns (2) to (4) is not necessarily inconsistent with the GVC theory. The complexity of 
the transaction is not the key distinguishing feature between Hierarchy and the other three 
relationship types. Nevertheless, the positive estimate of 0.270 in column (2) suggests 
that captive relationships tend to be more appropriate for less complex transactions than 
in-house produced parts which is not implausible. In contrast, the regressions 
distinguishing hierarchy from relational and modular governance generated negative 
coefficients of –0.316 and –0.144 on the complexity variable. It suggests those 
governance types are for transactions with even higher complexity than for in-house 
produced transactions, again not implausible given that these relationships are chosen 
when suppliers bring unique capabilities. 
High codifiability makes outsourcing more likely in three of the four cases. In 
particular, the –0.116 estimate in column (2) for hierarchy against captive and the –0.189 
estimate in column (4) for hierarchy against modular are both negative as predicted by 
the theory. Market transactions appear even more codifiable (with an estimate of –0.246) 
and Relational transactions weakly less so (the estimate is 0.094), which is intuitive. 
Finally, both relational and modular governance are chosen for transactions where 
highly capable suppliers are present, as indicated by the –0.266 and –0.089 estimates in 
columns (3) and (4). When no capable suppliers are available, in-house production is 
preferred. While the theory predicts that both captive and hierarchy governance are valid 
alternatives when (potential) supplier capabilities are low, this seems especially the case 
for the captive type. Market suppliers only need enough capabilities to be able to make 
non-complex parts, but the estimate of –0.058 suggests that it requires slightly more skills 
than potential suppliers have when firms choose not to outsource. The estimates on the 
capability variable are in all four columns exactly in line with the theory and expectations 
even when control variables are introduced. This contrasts with the unexpected positive 
estimate of 0.112 in column (5) of Table 5, which highlights the importance of making 
comparisons with each outsourced type separately. 
In sum, predictions of the GVC theory regarding the make-or-buy decision are 
strongly supported by the estimates. The general decision whether to outsource or not (in 
Table 5) has no unique predictions if one does not know what type of governance 
outsourcing will take. While the partial correlations lead to intuitive first-order effects for 
each explanatory variable on its own, it leads to some counterintuitive estimates when 
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control variables are introduced, as outsourcing transactions can be of different types. 
However, when the choice of governance mode is explicitly taken into account (in  
Table 6), the estimates on the three key explanatory variables are entirely in line with the 
predictions. 
5.2 Transitions between governance types 
We treat all transactions in our dataset as a cross-section of observations. While they 
almost all come from the same decade, they reflect choices on components that are at 
different stages in the life-cycle of their technologies. Some parts were only introduced 
recently and are still very novel to the industry. Other parts have matured a lot and many 
aspects of their design and production have been standardised (Klepper, 1997). 
As parts mature, we expect all three explanatory variables of interest to increase, 
either gradually or in discrete steps. Performance dimensions and other requirements 
become codifiable if both buyers and suppliers acquire expertise producing parts with a 
new technology. As they solve problems and gain experience, suppliers acquire 
capabilities. Eventually, products become standardised and well-understood and they are 
not considered as complex anymore. Rather than being collaborative sub-assemblies, they 
gradually become commodified. 
We can thus give the choice between alternative governance types an evolutionary 
interpretation. As we compare how sourcing choices differ between parts with differing 
codifiability, for example because one part’s technology has matured more quickly or for 
a longer period already, we also learn how the governance choice for a new part is likely 
to evolve as it matures itself. To present and discuss such possible evolutionary paths in a 
transparent way, we distinguish between components where codifiability increases first, 
followed by an evolution where capabilities increase first. 
5.2.1 Technology becomes codified first 
The above evidence suggests that when technologies become codifiable and standardised, 
the probability of outsourcing increases; in particular, according to the results in Table 6, 
outsourcing of the captive, modular, or market type. To understand how the relative 
attractiveness of different sourcing modes evolves without imposing a lot of structure, we 
show in Table 7 the direct differences of market shares in different situations. 
Table 7 Differences in average market shares for components with low or high codifiability 





a Full sample 
Low 0.42% 1.94% 0.43% 0.49% 
High 0.42% 1.94% 0.55% 0.37% 
b Only small and young suppliers 
Low 0.39% 2.07% 0.43% 0.56% 
High 0.44% 2.24% 0.44% 0.46% 
Comparing the first two rows which distinguish between transactions with low or high 
codifiability, a notable difference is the low average market share of suppliers when 
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transactions are more codifiable, while the components themselves attain a higher 
average market share, this accords with the TCE logic. As a component is less specific 
and becomes more standardised, more carmakers will outsource it and competition 
between suppliers will drives down prices and individual market shares. At the same 
time, standardisation and outsourcing will increase the share of the component in the 
overall market for automotive parts. The other two market characteristics, the average 
share of each model or each OEM (buyer), are comparable across both sets of 
transactions. 
The results in the second panel of Table 7 show that in a subset of the data, namely 
for small and young suppliers, the share of components is not higher for codifiable 
transactions but the shares of car models and OEMs are higher. The supplier shares move 
in the opposite direction, as was the case in the full sample. This evidence is more in line 
with an alternative theory of the firm, the property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 
1986). It emphasises the relative importance of each firm for joint value creation and is 
likely to be related to our measure of supplier capability. Once transactions are codifiable 
and outsourcing becomes more common, a natural further evolution is for suppliers to 
increase their expertise with the technology and gradually obtain greater power in the 
relationship. According to the GVC theory predictions in Table 2, we would expect to see 
the governance to evolve from captive to more modular relationships. 
In Table 8 we again use the discrete governance proxies obtained using pairwise 
comparisons (as in Table 6) to verify whether the different explanatory variables co-move 
with the governance forms in line with the theoretical predictions. In particular, 
comparing the predictions for the different governance types in Table 2, we see that there 
are many instances where two types only differ with respect to one explanatory variable 
and in those cases we have highlighted the coefficient estimate on the key distinguishing 
variable. 
Table 8 Governance transitions starting from increased codifiability 
 
Hierarchy vs. captive Captive vs. modular Modular vs. market 
(1) (2) (3) 
Complexity 0.270*** –0.223*** 0.308*** 
(0.048) (0.043) (0.079) 
Codifiability –0.116** 0.028 0.031 
(0.052) (0.046) (0.082) 
Capability 0.337*** –0.295*** 0.161 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.155) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,577 9.656 5,842 
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates which of the two types 
listed in the column heading fits best for each transaction. The linear probability 
model is estimated with ordinary least squares; it includes a full set of buyer and 
supplier fixed effects and control variables as described in the data section (which 
are not reported). The statistical significance of the point estimates is indicated as: 
*for the 10% level, **5%, ***1%. 
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If we start from a transaction where complexity is high, but both codifiability and 
complexity is low, the GVC prediction is that it should optimally occur in-house and the 
earlier evidence supported this. We can then envision a chain of changes where first the 
part becomes codifiable, outsourcing increases and suppliers build up capabilities next. 
After some time, the part becomes entirely standardised and is not considered complex 
anymore. This chain of events should lead to the following transitions in governance: 
hierarchy → captive → modular → market. 
We already showed that codifiability is indeed positively related with captive 
outsourcing when compared with Hierarchy and for completeness we repeated that 
evidence in column (1) of Table 8. The negative coefficient on capability in column (2) 
indicate that for outsourced transactions, governance is more likely to be modular than 
captive when supplier capabilities are high as well. Presumably this takes some time as 
(captive) suppliers first need to acquire expertise. Recall that the positive coefficient on 
capabilities in column (1) indicates that captive suppliers tend to have low capabilities 
relative to potential suppliers. 
Finally, a transition from modular to market governance is more likely when a 
transaction is classified as less complex, as evidenced by the positive 0.308 estimate in 
column (3), again in line with the GVC predictions. The pairwise comparisons of the four 
governance types in this order, which always differ in one characteristic in Table 2, are 
supported by point estimates in Table 8 that are always supporting the theory. 
5.2.2 Suppliers acquire capabilities first 
It is possible that suppliers working on related parts or with complementary technologies 
acquire capabilities to make a particular component even before a transaction becomes 
codifiable. We now investigate how governance evolves, both in the theory and in the 
dataset, when capabilities increase before codifiability. The previous evidence suggests it 
makes outsourcing more likely, see Table 5, and outsourcing of the relational, modular, 
or market type in particular, see Table 6. 
In Table 9 we compare the different market shares directly between transactions 
where suppliers have low or high capabilities. Comparing between the first two rows 
indicates that supplier shares are lower when capabilities are higher, but this is now 
accompanied by a lower component share, the reverse from the pattern in Table 7. This is 
what we would expect if outsourcing were of a market type – small firms producing 
standardised components – but not if important suppliers are producing differentiated 
products. 
In the second panel of Table 9 we show the same share differences limited to 
transactions that are complex. In this subset of observations, we expect Market 
relationships not too occur frequently. In line with our intuition, we now see a positive 
association between supplier shares and capabilities and the negative association between 
component shares and capabilities disappears as well. 
We now consider how the different characteristics predict pairwise differences in 
governance types if higher capabilities are the trigger to initially convince carmakers to 
outsource a part. The GVC theory makes specific predictions if first capabilities rise, then 
codifiability increases and eventually transactions cease to be complex. The 
corresponding chain of governance should be: hierarchy → relational → modular → 
market. 
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Table 9 Differences in average market shares for suppliers with low or high capability 





a Full sample 
Low 0.41% 2.06% 0.43% 0.53% 
High 0.42% 1.94% 0.30% 0.45% 
b Only complex transactions 
Low 0.39% 2.02% 0.43% 0.58% 
High 0.44% 2.14% 0.41% 0.83% 
The initial evidence in Table 5 did not provide unambiguous predictions. Higher 
capabilities were not systematically related to more outsourcing. However, once we 
distinguished between different forms of supplier governance in Table 6 we found that 
the insignificant effect was driven by a strong negative association between supplier 
capabilities and captive relationships, as expected, while the three other sourcing forms 
were more likely if suppliers are highly capable. The relational form in particular showed 
a very strong effect, and this is exactly the optimal form predicted by the theory if 
codifiability remains low and transactions are still complex. 
Table 10 Governance transitions starting from increased capabilities 
 
Hierarchy vs. relational Relational vs. modular Modular vs. market 
(1) (2) (3) 
Complexity –0.316*** 0.242*** 0.308*** 
(0.070) (0.085) (0.079) 
Codifiability 0.094 –0.387*** 0.031 
(0.075) (0.089) (0.082) 
Capability –0.266** 0.162*** 0.161 
(0.045) (0.053) (0.155) 
Observations 7,577 2,856 5,842 
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.10 0.06 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates which of the two types 
listed in the column heading fits best for each transaction. The linear probability 
model is estimated with ordinary least squares; it includes a full set of buyer and 
supplier fixed effects and control variables as described in the data section (which 
are not reported). The statistical significance of the point estimates is indicated as: 
*for the 10% level, **5%, ***1%. 
In Table 10 we show how governance evolves further after an initial switch from 
hierarchy to relational, triggered by an increase in capability – column (1) repeats the 
earlier evidence from Table 6. If close collaboration between the supplier and carmakers 
leads to some standardisation in the technology and ways to more easily communicate 
performance requirements, it is likely that gradually transactions become more codifiable 
and other forms of supplier relationships become feasible. In particular, the negative 
estimate of –0.387 on codifiability in column (2) indicates that Modular governance 
becomes preferable. However, relational governance remains preferred if the transactions 
are still highly complex and require especially high capabilities. The final transition from 
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modular to market is more likely when complexity finally reduces – as already shown in 
Table 8. 
6 Conclusions 
We used a novel dataset on sourcing transactions for the auto industry to study whether 
three characteristics that are popular in the GVC literature are able to accurately predict 
outsourcing decisions. Once the distinct forms of governance are taken into account, we 
find the patterns in the data to be remarkably well in line with the theoretical predictions. 
The correspondence between theory and empirical patterns has three dimensions. First, 
the observed make-or-buy decisions follow differences in complexity, codifiability, or 
supplier capability when Hierarchy (in-house) production is compared to specific 
alternative sourcing modes. Second, when comparing different governance modes of 
supplier relationships one-by-one, virtually, all correlations with the three transaction 
characteristics that are the key explanatory variables concord with the theory. Third, if we 
consider a natural evolution in the three characteristics – i.e., codifiability and supplier 
capabilities increase, while complexity decreases as a component matures – we can map 
out a series of governance transitions over time, which depends on the order of the 
changes. 
What do these findings imply for theory? One thing we want to emphasise is that our 
findings in support of the GVC theory do not imply that we depart from the predictions of 
alternative theories. In fact, the GVC theory was developed drawing explicitly on other 
theories and the three determinants of GVC governance play important roles in other 
theories as well – for instance capability is at the centre of the resource view of the firm, 
and complexity is closely related to asset specificity in TCE. 
A second implication of our analysis is more constructive. An important feature that 
distinguishes GVC from many other theories is that it breaks open the black box of 
intermediate, network forms of supplier relationships that are between in-house 
production and outsourcing to anonymous markets. While the typology of captive, 
modular, and relational governance is stylised, it is remarkable that even our imperfectly 
measured transaction characteristics can distinguish between them. In particular, every 
single coefficient sign in our regressions that compare hierarchy to specific outsourcing 
types (Table 6) accords with the GVC predictions, even when the regressions contain a 
rich set of control variables. In contrast, adding control variables to our regressions of 
Hierarchy versus generic outsourcing [column (5) of Table 5], which lumps the different 
outsourcing types together lead to unexpected sign reversals on two of the three 
coefficients. It highlights that failing to distinguish between different governance types 
makes it much harder to come up with a plausible model for the make-or-buy decision 
and the theory of the firm. 
We consider this only a first step in the investigation of the predictive power of the 
GVC theory and suggest at least two avenues for future research. One next step would be 
to test the strength of the GVC predictions out of sample and against specific alternative 
theories. A second direction is to explicitly identify newly introduced components that 
use a novel technology and see whether the evolution of its sourcing patterns over time, 
rather than in the cross-section of transactions, is also in line with the theoretical 
predictions. 
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Notes 
1 The website https://globalvaluechains.org/ lists several hundreds of publications using this 
framework, most of which are either theoretical contributions or studies of a single industry. 
2 The importance of technology and productivity spillovers from MNCs to smaller, local 
suppliers (Sönmez, 2013) and geographical, cultural, and relational proximity between 
automakers and suppliers (Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck, 2013) are two related themes that 
have been studied extensively in the literature. 
3 For firms with production plants in multiple industries, we include each as a separate 
observation. 
4 Note that we are not interested in the technical difficulty of producing the product per se. 
While we expect the contractual complexity and technological complexity to coincide in many 
cases, we expect an even stronger link with the sophistication of the product’s performance 
characteristics. Product differentiation would be one aspect of this, capturing the importance 
of performance dimensions that distinguish products beyond price differences. 
5 In Table 2 we indicate ‘high’ for codifiability and capability in the first line, where 
transactions are not complex. We added an asterisk as these should not be interpreted in an 
absolute sense, but only relative to the Low complexity of the transaction (in the first column). 
In particular, it is not at all certain that the requirement of High capabilities for a supplier in 
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the Market type is more demanding than the Low capabilities required in captive governance, 
as only the latter refers to capabilities needed to produce a high(ly) complex transaction. 
6 Note that the control variables included in the analysis, in particular the distance between 
supplier and client plants as well as the full set of client dummies, will hold these effects 
constant. 
7 Brandt and Van Biesebroeck (2005) describe how Western automakers indirectly strengthened 
their Chinese competitors when they built up the local supply chain in China and were not able 
to prevent these local suppliers to work for Chinese OEMs. The rush into the most rapidly 
growing market in the world, exactly at a time when all three US firms were on the verge of 
bankruptcy, combined with the legal requirement to work through joint ventures, generated a 
tension between short-run gains and long-run risks. It leads to behaviour that deviated from 
the expected captive relationships. 
8 Klein (2007) investigates the failed attempt of general motors to hold Fisher body a captive 
supplier. 
9 Both of these variables are predicted approximately at the time the supply contract is signed 
and they are both provided in our dataset. 
10 One way to alleviate the uncertainty would be through codification and standards, hence we 
will predict different governance approaches for complex transactions depending on the 
codifiability. 
11 An even simpler indicator we experimented with classifies components as either stand-alone 
parts or as sub-assemblies or larger modules that consist of several parts and need to be 
assembled themselves. Results were qualitatively similar using this alternative measure of 
complexity. 
12 The mean differs from an exact 50-50 split because approximately 10% of the transactions in 
the dataset had a number of sub-categories exactly equal to the median value. 
13 Further information on the AUTOSAR initiative can be found at http://www.autosar.org/. 
14 At the extreme, a component is never outsourced and the variable become infinitely large, but 
then we would not know anything about it. 
15 As we divide two market shares in each definition, the normalisation of the summed quantities 
in the numerator and denominator always drops out. 
16 In some industries, e.g., the apparel industry, supply chains can be buyer-driven leading to 
captive upstream suppliers, or producer-driven leading to captive downstream retailers 
(Gereffi, 1999). In the automotive sector only the former type is relevant. 
